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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to unpick and explore Du Boisian ideas of minority 
consciousness and double consciousness, to elaborate why they are of value and worth 
redeeming, and to situate them in relation to the Hegelian phenomenology.  The article 
shows that while an understanding of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is helpful in grasping 
how Du Bois conceives of the power held by a dominant group to afford status, Du Bois was 
keenly aware that no less important was the ability to invoke complicity or use coercion in 
denying recognition.  To this end the article refuses the view that Du Bois straightforwardly 
adopted a Hegelian approach in a manner that minimises how this aspect of Du Bois’ work 
also reflected remarkable intellectual originality that overcame Hegel’s weaknesses. The 
article goes on to demonstrate how Du Bois’ concept presents sociology with something of 
normative category that captures the dual character of unrecognised minority subjectivities 
and their transformative potential, alongside the conditions of impaired status that are 
allocated to racial minorities.    
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Born before the invention of the electric lightbulb, William Edward 
Burghart Du Bois (1868-1963) would go on to make an astonishing 
contribution to the social and political sciences.  By the time of his death, at 
which point satellites were orbiting the earth, his scholarly and wider 
intellectual repertoire ought to have secured his reputation as ‘one of the most 
imaginative, perceptive, and prolific founders of the sociological discipline’ 
(Zuckerman, 2004, 3).  A number of contributions over the last two decades 
have addressed why this did not happen.  Most have focused on his omission 
from the ‘canon’ and so especially sought to reposition Du Bois as a ‘founding 
figure’ of sociology (Morris, 2016; Kendhammer, 2007; Young, Jr., Watts, 
Marable, Lemert, and Higginbotham, 2007; Gates, 2007; Zuckerman, 2004; 
Gates and Oliver, 1999; Bell, Grosholz and Stewart, 1996; Lemert, 1994).   
 
This approach has heralded some important symbolic advances. For example, 
in 2006 a group of sociologists led a successful campaign to rename the 
American Sociological Association’s (ASA) highest award, the Career of 
Distinguished Scholarship Award, after Du Bois (Morris, 2007).  Elsewhere 
Burawoy’s (2005: 417) intervention on applied social science named Du Bois 
‘as perhaps the greatest public sociologist of the twentieth century’.  The most 
exhaustive recent attempt to relocate Du Bois within a conventional canon of 
sociology has probably been Morris’ (2015) widely acclaimed A Scholar 
Denied.  Crediting Levering-Lewis’ (1993, 2000) two Pulitzer Prize winning 
biographies for this upsurge, Morris (2015, 1) has even claimed that we are 
now ‘in the age of Du Bois’ (ibid. 1)ii.   
 
While not insignificant, these advances and associated optimism might also be 
read in the context of Bhambra’s (2014, 485) characterisation of its 
parameters, in so far as ‘[s]imple inclusion without reconstruction based on an 
acknowledgement of the difference that inclusion makes is…inadequate […]’.   
That is to say, Du Bois’ recognition in some quarters has not so far not come 
with a willingness to revise an overwhelming white sociological canon that 
prevails throughout the mainstream configuration of US and European 
sociology. This is sustained by the active omission of a broader range of 
sociological work that could remake the very activity of sociology as a 
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disciplinary pursuit.  The continuing ‘sociological segregation’, as Back and 
Tate (2015, para 4:8) put it in their discussion of both Du Bois and Stuart Hall, 
‘weakens the field as a whole, not only for those to whom it offers a racially 
unequal place at the table of ideas’. 
 
Morris (2015) nonetheless provides a detailed and compelling treatment 
which, like the work of Zuckerman (2004), takes the entire sweep of Du Bois’ 
oeuvre and orients it, very persuasively, to his omission from core features of 
American sociology in particular.  Such comprehensive approaches are surely 
warranted, but this article argues that it would also be valuable to engage in a 
much more focused delineation of specific features of Du Bois’ corpus. 
 
Here perhaps historians have led the way. For example, Axel Schaffer (2001) 
provides a fascinating account of Du Bois’ participation in the period known as 
‘American progressivism’ (1982-1909), and reinterprets a relatively early 
period of Du Bois’ life and work.  Elsewhere, Ellis’ (1992) study of Du Bois 
during the first world war, concentrating especially on the controversies over 
Du Bois’ insistence on the need to ‘close ranks’ in support of the US war effort, 
focuses on The Crisis magazine which Du Bois edited.  Kendhammer (2007) 
too, engaging more explicitly with social theory, offers a historical treatment of 
the later period of Du Bois’ life and work, especially his Pan-Africanism, and 
considers the extent to which this might represent a non-linear strand 
throughout his work.   
 
Kendhammer (2007) is especially interesting in his discussion of the 
‘periodization’ of Du Bois e.g., early-liberal; middle-radical; later-pan-
Africanist, and it would be worthwhile to explore a similar approach in Du 
Bois’ social theory; not to repeat the impulse of historians, but to double down 
on a section of writing in a manner pursued by of scholars of other canonical 
thinkers (not unlike the discussion of Marx’s 1844 manuscripts or Weber’s 
protestant ethic thesis).  The objective of this article therefore is to give fuller 
exposure to parts of Du Bois that are otherwise obscured in approaches to his 
entire corpus which insist on a single ‘normative and conceptual logic’ (Reed, 
1985, 432).   
 
To this end the article provides a detailed consideration of Du Bois’ theory of 
double consciousness, and specifically it’s a relationship to thinking about 
‘recognition’ as it is found in the Souls of Black Folk (1903).  It is fitting that 
this is proposed here in The Sociological Review given TSR is the only UK 
sociology journal to have published a paper penned by Du Bois (1911) himself 
(to mark the first Universal Races Congress held in London) (see Bhambra, 
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2016).  It is further worth registering that whilst Du Bois continues to be 
resurrected in the American literature on sociology, with some exceptions this 
is less the case on this side of the Atlantic, an omission that should not go 
unnoticed.    
 
A Hegelian Du Bois? 
 
While the article is especially interested in the Hegelian ethics related to 
‘double consciousness’ as a set of sociological processes, understanding the 
motive for this is key. The article refuses the view that Du Bois 
straightforwardly adopted a Hegelian approach in a manner that minimises 
how this aspect of Du Bois’ work also reflected remarkable intellectual 
originality.  The tendency is contained in a variety of commentaries on Du 
Bois.  Adell (1994, 8), for example, has insisted that double-consciousness 
largely ‘emerges from the philosophy of Hegel as it is articulated in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit’, arguing ‘the title of Du Bois’s text itself, The Souls 
of Black Folk, remarks and reiterates the two concepts—soul and folk—(Volk) 
that are central, not only to Herder’s aesthetics, but to that of Hegel as well’ 
(ibid. 23).  The tendency I observe, however, is not recent.  Williamson’s 
(1978) influential essay ‘W.E.B. Du Bois as a Hegelian’ perhaps set the tone, 
and we could also here include Siemerling (2001, 325) who, drawing on 
Zamir’s (1995) longer work, seeks to read Souls ‘through the context of Du 
Bois' appropriation of Hegel’.  This strain of thought has endured in some 
contemporary work, including Shaw’s (2013, 12) more recent book simply 
titled W. E. B. Du Bois and The Souls of Black Folk, in which she boldly asserts 
that Du Bois was ‘at all times’ a philosopher in the Hegelian vein, and that in 
this respect Souls in particular is an example of ‘old fashioned metaphysics’ 
(2013, 130).  
 
This is not to deny that Du Bois was informed by Hegel’s conception of 
consciousness. On the contrary.  This article concurs with a variety of agenda 
setting scholars as varied as Mostern (1996), Zamir (1995). Gilroy (1993), 
Levering-Lewis (1993), Gooding-Williams (1987), and Rampersad (1976), each 
of whom explicitly argue that Du Bois was working with Hegel’s conception of 
consciousness and synthesising this with his own sociological imagination.  As 
we will see, this is a different activity to seeking ‘vindicationist’ approaches 
tracing Du Bois’s alleged debts to European ‘greats’ (Reed, 1997, 12).  Yet even 
these authors who register Du Bois’ creative and constructive engagement with 
Hegel do not dwell on this in ways that show the variety of possible 




There are moreover compelling contextual and intellectual rationales to revisit 
the relationship between Hegelian metaphysics and Du Boisean social theory.  
This article is nearly entirely focused on the intellectual reasons, but the 
contextual factors are not insignificant and so are touched on here.  They 
include how Du Bois’ substantive encounter with Hegel first occurred during 
his time in Berlin, especially under the instruction of the members of the 
German Historical School, not least his university sponsor Gustav von 
Schmoller (1838-1913). This is not the same as the circumstantial encounters 
between Max Weber and Du Bois summarily dismissed as relatively 
inconsequential by Morris (2015).  It instead emerges during a period of 
‘American progressivism’ where Du Bois along with many other US students 
and scholars travelled to German institutions.  It was a period that Du Bois 
himself later credited as encouraging him to ‘understand the real meaning of 
scientific research and the dim outline of methods of employing its technique 
and its results in the new social sciences for the settlement of the Negro 
problems in America’ (Du Bois, 1968, 160).  According to Shaffer (2001, 926), 
the German Historical School’s conception of social ethics as ‘anchored values 
in social interaction and participation… had radical implications for his 
thinking on race’.  Approaching the same issue from a slightly different 
perspective, specifically the ways in which Du Bois contributes to an ‘early 
black modernism’, Gilroy (1993, 133) offers a similar assessment, arguing that: 
 
It is deeply ironic then that the obsession with black exceptionalism which endows 
The Souls with much of its intellectual drive is itself the obvious product of the 
author’s journeying outside the United States.  It gives voice to an understanding of 
the relationship between race, nationality and culture which, even if Du Bois acquired 
it in the United States (and this is debateable), was considerably refined in Germany 
through an engagement with Hegel and the neo-Hegelian thought that was popular in 
Berlin while he was studying there (ibid. 133-134).     
 
As discussed below, much of this was expressed through an engagement with 
Hegelian metaphysics concerning the nature of spirit. As Du Bois would later 
put it, ‘Black blood with us in America is a matter of spirit and not simply of 
flesh’ (Du Bois, 1974, 19).  As we will come to consider, and as described by 
Sandstrum (1999, 5), ‘spirit, for DuBois, is created out of cultural and political 
strivings. Black spirit, shwarzegeist, is derived from common experience of 
being black in America and continuously exposed to antiblack American 
‘racial’ politics.’   We might at this point also note Du Bois’ argument in the 
Souls of Black Folks (1999 [1903]), 370), that ‘there are to-day no truer 
exponents of the pure human spirit of the Declaration of Independence than 
the American Negroes’, arguably reflects a Hegelian influence.  Rather more 
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boldly, in the first of his two Pulitzer Prize winning biographies, Levering-
Lewis (1993) has put it as follows: 
 
Du Bois found in Hegelian World-Spirit, dialectically actualizating itself through 
history, a profoundly appealing concept. […] Surely this was an idea Du Bois would 
eventually reformulate more poetically (139-40). 
 
This notwithstanding, and beyond the contextual association, neither 
Levering-Lewis (1993) nor to my mind any author cited above, or elsewhere, 
explores this in any sustained or textually detailed fashion. Nor do these 
authors sufficiently consider that we might reverse the interaction and ask 
what might be learned from reading Hegelian metaphysics through Du Boisian 
social theory.  In so doing this also shows the limitations of Hegelian 
reasoning that in important ways Du Bois was correcting. So it is a type of 
dialectical dialogue that is being pursued here, rather than a genealogy. 
 
The article carries this argument forward by outlining a distinct and original 
delineation of double consciousness into a set of constituent parts.  These, it is 
argued, emerge as an outcome and a resource in relation to the need to 
maintain a sense of self in response to misrecognition.  Double consciousness 
for these reasons is presented as a sociological concept that has a wider 
normative quality, one that captures the dual character of unrecognised 
minority subjectivities and their transformative potential, alongside the 
conditions of impaired civic status that are allocated to minorities. 
 
Delineating Double Consciousness 
 
In his chapter ‘Of Our Spiritual Strivings’ in Souls (1999[1903]), Du Bois 
argues that the fate of American consciousness is dependent upon the 
unfolding relationships and the dialogue or interaction between minority and 
majority subjectivities; as two separate but entwined forms of consciousness. 
It is, moreover, these dialectics which will, for Du Bois, determine the course 
of American history.  Du Bois introduces his account of double consciousness 
in the following passage from Strivings, and since this is the main text that I 
wish to focus upon in the proceeding discussion, it is worth quoting at length:  
 
…the Negro is…born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight in this American 
world, - a world which yields to him no true self consciousness, but only lets him see 
himself through the revelation of the other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
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thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American 
Negro is the history of this strife,-this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to 
merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of 
the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too 
much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of 
white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He 
simply wishes to make it possible to be both a Negro and an American, without being 
cursed and spat upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed 
roughly in his face (Du Bois, 1999 [1903], 10-11).iii   
 
On the surface, this passage has as its fundamental theme a duality in African 
American life.  Fuelled largely - but not exclusively - by racism, this duality is a 
kind of paradox which stems from being intimately part of a polity while 
excluded from its public culture, or, as Du Bois puts it, ‘being an outcast and 
stranger in mine own house’ (ibid).  Yet further scrutiny reveals four different 
issues, loosely grouped into two sets, which encompass more. Since there are a 
range of issues signalled in his description of double consciousness, and 
because this range attempts to mediate between agency and structure, 
individual and society, and between minority and majority subjectivities, there 
has on occasions been a tendency to conflate, reduce or confuse the role of one 
to the other.  
 
In the opening half of the passage, Du Bois outlines his reading of the self, 
specifically the significance of (1a) the internalisation by African-Americans of 
the contempt white America has for them, and (1b) the creation of an 
additional perspective in the form of a ‘gifted second sight’ to which 
experiencing this gives rise.  In the second half of the passage he identifies how 
societal in-congruencies emerge from (2a) conceiving of African-Americans as 
having fewer civic rights but no less the duties or responsibilities of an ideal of 
American citizenship, and (2b) diverging sets of un-reconciled ideals or 
‘strivings’ held by African-Americans which are objected to by white society, 
specifically emerging from an ‘enduring hyphenation’ signalled in his notion of 
‘twoness’.  In sum, these four interacting constructs give rise to a condition of 
double consciousness as Du Bois understood it.  The function of descriptive 
metaphors such as the ‘veil’ cut across and straddle these interacting issues, 









The notion of the self plays an important role in Du Bois’ concept, and - 
beginning with his reference to looking at one’s self through the eyes of others 
- Du Bois, like Hegel, seeks to illustrate how our sense of self is necessarily 
constructed in a dialogue that is continually subject to implicit power 
relations.  Of course all theories of the self in sociology emphasize the 
importance of the ‘generalised other’ and the ‘significant other’.  Mead (1934), 
for example, would later refer to this process as ‘engaging with our significant 
others’, and Goffman (1959) would situate it in the context of ‘dramaturgy’. It 
is worth stressing that recognising how Du Bois elaborated notions of the 
social-self prior to those named above, and others who come later, is not the 
same as anchoring Du Bois in the same register as ‘symbolic interactionists’ or 
other action theorists.  In Du Bois’s case one is not thinking of a benign self-
other relationship but one predicated on domination, such that the refusal of 
others to acknowledge one’s humanity or faculty to contribute something 
meaningful, inevitably underscores a sense of alienation. There is a Hegelian 
feature to this in so far as Du Bois sees something unique about the 
consciousness of the self among African-Americans. As Williamson (1984, 
405) put it: ‘out of slavery and out of the later striving of black folk...in an 
oppressive white world came a rising sense of black soul’.  
 
Yet as an ‘other’ and as ‘a problem’, ‘black folk’ developed a double 
consciousness where they have a sense ‘of always looking at one’s self through 
the eyes of others’.  Presenting African-Americans as possessing a degraded 
cultural heritage or limited contribution to American life creates an internal 
echo of white America’s racist judgements.  It should be clear then that this 
conception of the self is not, for Du Bois, a reflection of the atomistic self.  It is 
instead conceived of as culturally embedded and socially mediated; leading Du 
Bois to argue that self-recognition is a form of cultural recognition which, 
necessarily, sees one’s cultural identity in connection with the cultural 
identities of other members of one’s community. Hence the injuries suffered 
from racism are not only due to the overt hostility from the majority, but also 
come from minority invisibility.  This first source of conflict in Du Bois’ 
passage can then be seen as contributing to a sense of double consciousness 
through the unwillingness of one group, contingent on their historical 
dominance as ‘master’, to recognise African-Americans satisfactorily, to the 
extent that the consciousness of self is established distortedly through that of 
another.   
 
 




Accompanying Du Bois’ understanding of the self is the role of subjectivity, for 
he situates the standpoint developed within minority-majority relations at the 
centre of his account of double consciousness. This comes through in his 
insistence that oppression allows African-Americans to understand the 
promise of freedom in a way that white Americans cannot.iv  In the passage 
from Strivings Du Bois refers to this as ‘a second sight’, a way of seeing things 
that escape the notice of the majority, specifically the distance between 
democratic ideals and the practice of racial exclusion, so that ‘once in a while 
through all of us there flashes some clairvoyance, some clear idea of what 
America really is. We who are dark can see America in a way that Americans 
cannot’ (Du Bois, 1971: 416). This is realised in everyday scenarios where it is 
raised to a conscious level, serving as a means to probe deeper meanings and 
contradictions of a racialized experience and providing the resource for 
transformative change. For Du Bois, then, racial alienation is arguably similar 
to forms of class alienation in its potential for initiating consciousness.   
 
This notion of ‘second sight’ also ties into his metaphor of the veil which, in 
the passage, serves as an expression of how those behind it – African-
Americans - see the dominant society, whilst those in front of it – white 
America - do not see the excluded as full co-members of their polity. In this 
way, it might be argued that Du Bois presents an inverted version of the early 
Rawlsian thought experiment of placing a ‘choosing subject’ behind ‘a veil of 
ignorance’ in an effort to ascertain unbiased, and transcending, propositions 
of human interest.  What such an understanding means is that the Du Boisian 
subject is looking out in full knowledge of critical aspects of their identity.  
Moreover, and unlike the early Rawls (1971), Du Bois does not consider it 
possible to presuppose that a person can be detached from the contingent 
aspects provided by society, history and culture. In fact, he explicitly advances 
an account of social pluralism in which people are encouraged to cultivate the 
moral and aesthetic insights that are contained in their culture for the benefit 
of humanity.  
 
Du Bois’ veil might then best be described as a one-way mirror, with the 
minority seeing the majority through the glass, whilst the latter sees only their 
own reflection (of mastery or dominance) as the former remain behind the 
mirror. This quite obviously challenges Hegel, specifically in Du Bois’ 
suggestion that those without power are able to see those with power in a 
different light, since the actions of those without power must always take the 
powerful into account, and specifically that the master can coerce the slave 
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with a power that the slave lacks, which may explain why Du Bois argues that 
‘second sight’ is both a gift and a burden. 
 
Bound by the requirements but not the rewards of citizenship 
 
The overarching structural factors which Du Bois identifies as contributing to 
a sense of double consciousness are twofold. The first is revealed in his 
assertion that historically embedded racial dualism in mainstream American 
society denies African-Americans the civic rights afforded to their white 
counterparts. Simultaneously, however, this racial dualism continues to 
conceive of African-Americans as having no less the duties or responsibilities 
of an ideal of American citizenship. He thus argues that within the rhetoric of 
democratic citizenship and its attendant ideals, ‘the Nation has not yet found 
peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in freedom his promised 
land’ (Du Bois, 1999 [1903], 12).   For Du Bois however, an otherwise 
overlooked but important symptom of this dichotomy is the effect it has in 
stifling internal criticism and descent, giving rise to what he describes as a 
‘moral hesitancy that is fatal to self-confidence’ (1999 [1903], 127). This is 
because internal criticism is impeded or sacrificed within the minority group, 
because the starting point of representation takes the form of a combative 
defence against societal biases. Du Bois calls these ‘peculiar problems of inner 
life’ which occur because ‘our worst side has been so shamelessly emphasised 
that we are denying that we ever had a worst side [so that] in all sorts of ways 
we are hemmed in’ (ibid).   
 
Diverging strivings and two-ness 
 
The second structural factor which Du Bois identifies as contributing to a 
sense of double consciousness is outlined both in his discussion of different 
sets of ‘strivings’ or claims upon the public sphere, and ‘twoness’ as a 
hyphenated identity. These are both quite distinct from the potentially 
debilitating effects evident in the first two, since they, like the third, provide a 
resource for a new synthesis.  This derives from ‘strivings’ or cultural 
attributes amongst African-Americans who seek to affirm both their American 
and African identities. The following statement, repeated from the passage 
taken from Strivings, tries to sketch this out:  
 
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife...to attain self-conscious 
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.  In this merging he 
wishes neither of the older selves to be lost.  He would not Africanize America for 
America has too much to teach the world and Africa.  He simply wishes to make it 
possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit 
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upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed in his face (Du 
Bois, 1999 [1903], 10-11). 
 
Du Bois here is encouraging a reflexive understanding between origin and 
destination, between what Gilroy (1993) has called ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, and not 
only arguing that there is space for both, but that both be positively cultivated 
in an effort to maintain a critical perspective towards a new synthesis or 
hyphenation.  As he put it in another essay, ‘The Conservation of Races’, from 
a similar period:   
 
Here, then, is the dilemma, and it is a puzzling one, I admit.  No Negro who has given 
earnest thought to the situation of his people in America has failed, at some time in 
life, to find themselves at these crossroads; has failed to ask at some time: What, after 
all, am I?  Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both? [...] We are Americans, 
not only by our birth and citizenship, but by our diverging political ideals...  (Du Bois, 
2003 [1897], 24). 
 
This is then an unapologetic objection to forms of cultural assimilation or 
separatism, strongly endorsing a view that cultural and/or moral diversity may 
be captured within hyphenated identities. 
 
A Pragmatist Provenance? 
 
Before I relate this to a Hegelian story a parallel observation concerns 
whether or not it should indeed be anchored in a ‘pragmatist’ milieu.  To some 
extent, this is precisely the move West (1989, 148) makes in The American 
Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, and in which he argues 
that ‘Du Bois provides American pragmatism with what it sorely lacks’.  
Specifically, West maintains, Du Bois went beyond figures like William James 
‘who did not see social structures, only individuals’, John Dewey who did see 
social structures ‘yet primarily through an American lens’, and Sidney Hook 
‘whose cold war sentiments’ gave him ‘tunnel vision’ (West, ibid.).  Du Bois in 
contrast goes beyond them all in ‘the scope and depth of his vision: creative 
powers reside among the wretched of the earth even in their subjugation, and 
the fragile structures of democracy in the world depend, in large part, on how 
these powers are ultimately exercised’ (ibid.). 
 
Whether this characterisation of James, Dewey and Hook is necessarily fair, 
what is interesting is that despite West’s (1989) positioning of Du Bois as a 
solution to these shortcomings, his ultimate appraisal of Du Bois is that he 
‘falls short of the mark’ (West, 1996, 55).  The reasons for this are as much 
biographical as intellectual.  As a ‘black New England Victorian seduced by the 
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Enlightenment ethos and enchanted with the American dream’, in West’s 
reading Du Bois remained anchored in ‘the prevailing presuppositions and 
prejudices of modern Euro-American civilisation’ (ibid.). 
 
This is a remarkably partial reading, and not for the first time then Du Bois is 
simultaneously located both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ an unfolding history of 
America, but I would suggest that it is better to position Du Bois as such in 
terms of the vestiges of American pragmatist thought; so outside looking in, 
rather than inside, looking out.  I am not alone in this view.  Indeed, it is 
precisely the argument of Rampersad (1976), Goodings-Williams (1987), 
Outlaw (2001) and Gilroy (1993) advance, the latter arguing that ‘this way of 
positioning Du Bois’s work can lead to the novelty and power of his critique of 
modernity being overlooked’ (p. 137).  No less than that, maintains Gilroy, in 
the pragmatist appropriation, ‘Du Bois’s studiously constructed projection of 
doubleness gets lost’, specifically through ‘a needless affirmation of American 
intellectual ethnocentrism’ (ibid.).   
 
There are a corresponding set of arguments here about the etymology of the 
concept of double consciousness and pragmatism. The previous and 
subsequent discussion squarely locates this, following authors such as Zamir 
(1995), in relation to the Phenomenology studied in Berlin and then with 
George Santayana at Harvard.  Again this is not a mechanistic adoption since 
Du Bois' reading diverges from the prevailing American appropriation that 
services a teleological story about American context: ‘His use of Hegel can be 
read against the widespread adoption of Hegel in support of American 
nationalism and manifest destiny in America in the nineteenth century, from 
the voluminous productions of the St. Louis Hegelians to the essays of the 
young John Dewey’ (Zamir, 1995, 113).  Bell (1996, 89) meanwhile variously 
points to Emerson’s (1843) essay on The Transcendentalist which includes the 
term ‘double consciousness’ (as well as Goethe’s reference to ‘two souls’ in 
Faust) and William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology in which a patient 
is assessed to have ‘double consciousness’.  While I am in no doubt that a 
Hegelian influence is undeniable, and less sure of the others, perhaps they all 
bore down on Du Bois in subtler ways.  Others are less persuaded, as Levering-
Lewis (1993: 96) puts it, as an African American of his time Du Bois 
experienced ‘a psychic purgatory fully capable by itself of nurturing a concept 






‘A self-consciousness has before it another self-
consciousness…’  
 
Turning back then to his famous allegory of the master and the slave, Hegel 
outlines a series of conflicts and their dialectical relationship to different forms 
of consciousness.  In examining reciprocal relations of power, he attempts to 
‘lift the veil’ and reveal processes mediating the transformation of a 
consciousness from dependence to one of self-consciousness and 
independence.  It is worth clarifying at the outset that his is not an empirical 
account of power-relations in actual slave societies. Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic should instead be understood as an abstracted ‘state of nature’ 
argument conceived as a corrective to Hobbes (Davis, 1975).  By this it is 
meant that through the master-slave dialectic (MSD), Hegel is trying to trying 
to show the way a Hobbesian war of ‘all against all’ is unable to maintain the 
very individuality or independence upon which it is premised.  This is perhaps 
best captured in Binder’s (1989, 1435) interpretation of the MSD as an attempt 
to show that ‘freedom [has] to be conceived as some form of association rather 
than independence; and that it [has] to be mediated by politics rather than 
defended from politics’.  Besides stressing the primacy of the political, Binder 
positions the MSD as ‘an intellectual foundation for modern communitarian 
conceptions of freedom in its devastating critique of the ideal of independence’ 
(ibid, 1437). 
 
It perhaps also needs to be stated that what we are interested in this section is 
not principally the vignette about slavery or the social implications of its 
history and politics per se. It is accepted at the outset that Hegel and Du Bois 
would speak past each other on the specificities of empirical cases.  The point 
of this dialogue is to show that features of the MSD also bear fruit in Du 
Boisian thought, but that Du Bois addresses a key problematic contained 
within. The ethical basis this provides in terms of its potential normative, 
implications for Du Boisian conceptions of consciousness are that we cannot 
receive recognition outside of a political community characterised by 
reciprocal or mutual recognition.  That is, the obligations rendered under 
conditions of Sittlichkeitv or ethical life, ‘by virtue of being members of one of 
the ongoing bonded communities of common life and common freedom’ 
(Taylor, 1989a, 864).   
 
Following the initial conflict then, Hegel sees the dialectic as a representation 
of how the fate and consciousness of the two parties is no longer independent 
but, albeit unequally, interdependent in that they have become inextricably 
linked in a process that necessitates some form of resolution; that they 
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effectively have to sink or swim together. Taylor (1975, 155) shares this 
interpretation when he stresses that the process of coming to self-
consciousness is a ‘dualistic’ one.  For both Taylor and Kojeve the slave must 
recover their self-consciousness not only for their own survival, but also to 
resolve the existential impasse of the master.  Similarly, the master must 
recognize the fact that their fate is now directly dependent upon the 
development of the consciousness of the slave. The anticipated independence 
of the master becomes not only a dependence upon the slave for their present 
form of self-consciousness, but, more importantly, rests upon the possibility of 
the future development of that consciousness to a state of true self-
consciousness or independence. Specifically: the movement from a self-
consciousness in itself to the transformative potential of a self-consciousness 
for itself, or from one’s historically ascribed identity to one’s politically self-
constructed identity.    
 
There is of course a teleological prescription in some of these readings but 
what is of interest is the way in which something valuable can be stated, as it 
was by Du Bois, without it necessitating a teleological course, and this is no 
less true with the leap that Hegel makes from individual to group psyches. In 
common with a tradition amongst philosophers to begin with the rational self, 
Hegel also starts with the self but, as we have seen, argues that this cannot 
exist in a self-substantiating process, and so therefore communalises it.  Thus 
in contrast to Hobbes who argued that in leaving a ‘state of nature’ we lose 
freedom, Hegel shows that the social and the political is the condition of 
freedom in which self is a social or communal self.  As it is argued below, 
however, the sorts of recognition that Du Bois espouses does not follow from 
this alone.  That is to say the case for mutual recognition does not on its own 
establish the legitimacy of inclusion for Du Bois.  
 
Du Bois merges ideas of difference with citizenship, centred around modernist 
notions of hyphenated identities, in making a universalistic ethical move in 
arguing for the equal but differentiated inclusion of different groups on the 
basis of their common membership of a polity.  This is retuned to below, but 
what is required at this stage is a closer inspection of the internal logic of 
Hegel’s dialectic, where it is revealed that during his initial discussion of the 
development of consciousness, Hegel fails to distinguish between what appear 
to be three separate constructs in the MSD. 
 
In this article these multiple dialectics might roughly divide between (a) the 
present-focused as a logical interaction or binary, which distinguishes between 
the existence and non-existence of an interaction between two parties and (b) 
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the empirical possibilities to emerge from the power retained by the master 
who, in the final analysis, possesses an autonomy that the slave lacks.  These 
possibilities shape the future of this relationship and the ways in which it 
might continue (reciprocity being one possibility, coercion another).  The 
nature of the relationship as it exists and changes may then be described by 
tracing (c) the moral dialectic, which seeks to engage - through the masters’ 
authoritative paternalism - the slaves’ reciprocal complicity in the dialectic, 
serving to externalise and normalise the ethical constraints of this 
relationship.  In what one might cite as an unreasoned inference, Hegel 
utilises the two constructs of the dialectic, outlined as (a) and (c), which herald 
a mutual dependency for attaining status (however uneven that may be) 
between the master and the slave, before – through a sleight of hand - moving 
to tie the very development of consciousnessvi upon this struggle for status 
recognition.  My view is that Du Bois picks up on how Hegel circumvents a 
step in his allegory (b) which pertains to the empirical possibilities that, 
should the slave refuse to acquiesce with the master’s dominance, the master 
can coerce the slave as a subordinate and thwart the reciprocity required to 
make the dialectic function on the basis of recognition alone.  
 
Regardless, therefore, of the appropriate recognition granted to the master by 
the slave, the slave is dependent upon the Master for their coming to self-
consciousness, whilst the master retains the agency to minimise their own 
dependence upon the slave.  Thus, from a Du Boisian perspective it becomes 
clear that Hegel ignores the extent to which coercion can be either a 
competitor or partner of recognition.  In light of this, it might be more helpful 
to speak of master-slave dialectics in the plural, rather than the singular, and 
to suggest that there are actually three different interactions taking place in 
this allegory. This appears to be a more promising insight than the initial 
reading offered by Taylor and Kojeve, specifically because it can be employed 
to probe the intricacies of forms of consciousness developed in the present-
focused and moral dialectic outlined by Hegel, in order to distinguish between 
these and the empirical dialectic of majority-minority relations that so 




Expressions of double consciousness are neither mutually exclusive nor 
one and the same. By definition they must interact, but are suitably distinctive 
to be discussed separately. What they all have in common is the sense of an 
unresolved - but not irresolvable – conflict, anchored in a process of structural 
and psychic misrecognition. Thus, although formed in a specific context and 
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concerned with the conditions of a particular peoples, it is clear that in many 
ways Du Boisian conceptions of consciousness are relevant to the contention 
that socio-cultural self-esteem emerges from forms of group recognition, 
alongside personal recognition.  The relationship between personal and group 
recognition that is alluded to in Du Bois’ account is characterised by the idea 
that the ‘inner strife’ affecting African-Americans individually is informed by 
the mastery or dominance possessed by white Americans in depreciating their 
African-American counterparts.  This is described well in the following 
passage as: 
 
...that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this, he stands helpless, dismayed and 
well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule and 
systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical 
ignoring of the better and boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all-pervading desire to 
inculcate disdain... (Du Bois, 1999 [1903], 15).    
 
In this sense, the subject group are more disenfranchised than alienated so 
that, as Holt’s (1990) reading suggests, ‘it is not so much cultural difference 
but cultural disfranchisement that that shapes their struggle’.  This means that 
institutions and social practices attribute minority status to some inherent 
qualities in the minority group, as if those qualities were the reason rather 
than the rationalization for not taking their sensibilities into account.  This 
leads Du Bois to raise the following question: how can one achieve a mature 
self-consciousness and an integrity or wholeness of self in an alienating 
environment?  If, in the eyes of another, your humanity is perceived as lacking 
self-evidential qualities, how do you go about showing its existence?  The 
solution that Du Bois points to is not one of abandoning the double self but is, 
instead, to merge the ‘double self into a better and truer self ‘– one that does 
not deny experience and history but seeks to build on it.  As Levering-Lewis 
(1993, 281) argues:  
 
The genius of The Souls of Black Folk was that it transcended this dialectic in the most 
obvious way—by affirming it in a permanent tension.  Henceforth, the destiny of the race 
could be conceived as leading neither to assimilation nor separatism but to proud, 
enduring hyphenation. 
 
This is a kind of approach in which minorities can espouse a hyphenated 
identity, contribute and participate equally but not necessarily uniformly.  
This would not only produce a better America but the ‘better and truer self’ Du 
Bois thought possible.   At the same time, and although Du Bois implies the 
eventual resolution of this paradox of a divided self in time, much of what he 
writes simultaneously suggests that African-Americans should accept - and 
embrace – this contradiction arising from double consciousness.  This is 
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because ‘living in two worlds at once’ cultivates powers to see what the 
majority are blind to and so, through ‘second sight’, add something to the 
equation of diversity in the way Parekh (2000) would later describe as an 
expansion of horizons of thought and human fulfillment.  
 
 
Conclusion: an existential impasse writ large? 
 
The purpose of this article has been to unpick and explore Du Boisian 
ideas of minority consciousness and double consciousness, to elaborate why 
they are of value and worth redeeming, and explore where they sit in relation 
to Hegelian phenomenology.  In finding and correcting flaws in the MSD, Du 
Bois’ concept of double consciousness might lead us to reverse the interaction 
and ask what might be learned from reading Hegelian metaphysics through 
Du Boisian social theory. 
 
At a time when writers are justifiably rediscovering Du Bois and challenging 
prevailing disciplinary hegemonies through his work, amongst others, the 
article has also argued that there is virtue in trying to double down on a 
section of his writing in a manner pursued by of scholars of other canonical 
thinkers (not unlike the discussion of Marx’s 1844 manuscripts or Weber’s 
protestant ethic thesis).  The objective of this article therefore is to give fuller 
exposure to parts of Du Bois that are otherwise obscured in approaches to his 
entire corpus which insist on a single ‘normative and conceptual logic’ (Reed, 
1985, 432).   
 
Focusing on his writing on double consciousness, the article has argued that 
Du Bois’ concept is premised upon the idea that a consciousness for itself is 
characterised by an active mobilisation, one that is striving to be recognised, 
but which turns inward and becomes a double consciousness when it is 
benignly ignored or malignly coerced.  Double consciousness thus captures the 
dual character of unrecognised minority subjectivities and their 
transformative potential, alongside the conditions of impaired civic status that 
are allocated to racial minorities.    
 
What is being advocated is both a deepening of cultural particularities and a 
broadening of these insights.   Sociologically, this might be characterised as a 
schema which becomes progressively ‘thicker’ in capturing (a) the contexts in 
which minority subjectivity is formed, (b) the nature and form of this 
subjectivity in and for itself, alongside (c) the transformative potential it 
heralds for society as a whole.  This includes an examination of both the 
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conflicting accounts evident in the construction of the self, and the grounds on 
which minorities who are subject to exclusion can strive for recognition in 




i I am very grateful to the journal editors and three anonymous reviewers for their 
constructive criticism.  For reasons I am unsure this article has taken me over well over a 
decade to sit down and write, but I continue to be indebted to my former PhD supervisor for 
not turning me away all those years ago when I changed from my initial topic to focus on Du 
Bois.    
ii See the double special sections of Ethnic and Racial Studies Review on this book. 
iii  In some versions that reproduce the Atlantic Monthly (August, 1897) essay, the ending of 
the final line reads: ‘without losing the opportunity of self-development.’  
iv Lukacs (1971) later argued that structurally defined class positions could offer a superior 
vantage point with which to view social realities.  Later still some feminists, particularly 
Harding (1986), put forward the idea of ‘standpoint epistemologies’ which stressed that 
women’s experiences and location – their standpoint - could provide a better place from 
which to view knowledge production.   
v Referring to ‘the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am a part’ 
(Taylor, 1975, 376). 
vi Including the subsequent development of freedom because, for Hegel and later Du Bois, 
one can never be ‘free’ without at first developing a sense of consciousness, since the latter 
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